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ABSTRACT
An understudied area of public administration is administrative hearings, used by clients to
challenge denials or reductions of aid in public welfare programs. They help ensure that
officials are applying the law consistently, fairly and equitably, and as intended by policy
makers. Drawing on 59 qualitative interviews with public assistance clients in an urban and
suburban county in New York who received notices discontinuing or reducing their
assistance, this study explores why clients appeal or not and their perceptions of hearings.
The findings indicate that clients’ decisions to contest agency decisions were influenced by
their perceptions of how workers treated them, their reactions to powerlessness and stigma,
and their social networks, especially client networks. Clients who filed appeals perceived
hearings as a valuable tool, albeit one that needed improvements. Although concerned with
outcomes, they also focused on the procedural fairness of the hearing and whether they
had an opportunity to fully present their case to an impartial decision maker. Although some
clients had difficulty navigating the appeals process, procedural fairness was possible to
achieve, despite the evident power and status disparities between the parties.
An understudied area of public administration is administrative hearings, used by clients to
challenge denials or reductions of aid in public welfare programs. Every major public wel-
fare program, including the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program,
Medicaid, and Social Security, uses administrative ‘‘fair hearings’’ to resolve disputes. Fair
hearings are where citizens, often the very poor, make use of the legal machinery of gov-
ernment to challenge perceived mistakes. They help ensure that ofﬁcials are applying the
law consistently, fairly and equitably, and as intended by policy makers. They are a ﬁxed
feature of government, with states like New York holding over 80,000 hearings a year in its
TANF program.
The passage of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) has arguably increased the need for hearings. PRWORA, commonly referred
to as welfare reform, imposes a 5-year lifetime limit on beneﬁts and requires recipients to
work in exchange for beneﬁts. Recipients who do not comply with the work rules can
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be sanctioned, temporarily losing all or a part of their grant. This has made welfare
eligibility more complex, requiring often subjective and discretionary assessments of cli-
ents’ work behaviors (Diller 2000). Denying assistance is often equated with encouraging
self-sufﬁciency.
Much of the power to deny aid is held by front line workers. Because such enhanced
discretion and power can lead to inconsistencies and inequities in service delivery, in-
cluding errors of stringency, mechanisms for insuring worker accountability are essential
(Diller 2000). Fair hearings are one such mechanism, as states are required ‘‘to provide
opportunities for recipients who have been adversely affected to be heard in a state admin-
istrative proceeding’’ (42 U.S.C. Sec. 402). Hearings protect individual rights and access
to welfare, thus balancing welfare’s goals of ending dependency while supplying basic
needs.
Hearings also serve an important normative function. If perceived as fair, hearings
reinforce the legitimacy of governmental authority. They can convince clients of the ap-
propriateness and correctness of the governments’ actions even when no error has occurred
(Super 2005). It also sends important messages about social inclusion and citizenship when
government responds to complaints. This is especially relevant to welfare clients, whose
social exclusion and second-class status is well documented (Handler 2003; Hasenfeld
2000; Seccombe 2006).
Little is known about clients’ use of fair hearings as most empirical studies on the topic
were conducted decades ago. These studies, primarily quantitative, found low appeal rates
but high success rates. This project is part of a larger study, the ﬁrst in many decades, to
examine the fair hearing system. Using quantitative research methods, I ﬁrst examined
appeal rates and outcomes in three states, ﬁnding low appeal rates, except in New York
City, but high success rates. I next conducted an exploratory qualitative study comparing
appealers and non-appealers in Suffolk County, a suburban county in New York, where
appeal rates are low. This study builds on that study and explores in greater depth the dif-
ferences between appealers and non-appealers by comparing the two and by delving more
deeply into the less typical and perhaps more interesting phenomenon of what motivates
clients to assert their rights within the welfare center. Drawing on interviews with 59 clients
from Suffolk County and New York City who received notices discontinuing or reducing
their public assistance, I explore their decision to appeal or not and their experiences with
fair hearings.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Welfare relationships are complex. Broadly, they are about the relationship between gov-
ernment and its citizens. Because these relationships occur within a bureaucracy, they are
also about organizational behavior and how front line workers interact with clients. Be-
cause those clients are poor, they are also about powerlessness and stigma. Understanding
when poor citizens choose to challenge government decisions that affect their basic needs
thus requires many theoretical lenses. These include theories on how citizens evaluate the
fairness of government institutions, what triggers individuals in general to ﬁle formal com-
plaints, and how power or its absence affects people’s willingness to complain, especially
within public welfare bureaucracies.
Disputes are typically preceded by the perception a wrong has occurred, that some-
thing is unfair. There is a considerable body of literature that examines citizens’
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perceptions of fairness when interacting with government authorities (See for e.g.,
Lind, Tyler, and Huo 1997; Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler 2006; Tyler and Degoey
1995). Studies indicate that individuals distinguish between a fair outcome and a fair pro-
cess (Tyler 2006). They are concerned both with how a decision is made and what the
decision is. Both will inﬂuence their reaction to ofﬁcial decisions, with some, such as Tyler
(2006), arguing that procedural fairness is more important to people than substantive
fairness.
Substantive fairness means accurately and consistently applying the facts to a set of
criteria (Galligan 1996). Procedural fairness is more subjective and includes individuals’
perceptions of the decision maker and how they are treated. As Tyler (2006) found in his
study of how citizens view police ofﬁcers’ decisions, citizens want an impartial decision
maker who acts in good faith. They want their views considered and to be treated with
politeness and respect. Civility is especially important; courteous and polite behavior sig-
niﬁes that the individual is of high social worth. Its opposite—rude or abrupt behavior—
signiﬁes low social worth (Tyler 2006).
Welfare clients, like other citizens, are concerned with how they are treated as well as
substantive outcomes. Welfare bureaucracies, as numerous studies indicate, are often harsh
and unwelcoming (Bane and Ellwood 1994; Brodkin 1986; Gais et al. 2001; Hasenfeld
2000; Lurie and Riccucci 2003; Meyers, Glaser, and MacDonald 1998; Riccucci et al.
2004; Sandfort, Kalil, and Gottschalk 1999; Soss 2002). Welfare ofﬁces have been de-
scribed as the least hospitable of government ofﬁces (Handler 1986; Hasenfeld 2000; Soss
2002). Its clients—single parents, usually female—are among the most stigmatized and
powerless of social groups (Seccombe 2006). Interactions between workers and clients
are often demeaning, authoritarian and punitive, and tinged with moral approbation
(Hasenfeld 2000; Soss 2002). In such an environment, clients will likely ﬁnd fault with
their workers decision, whether that decision was correct or not. Perceptions of unfair treat-
ment are likely to generate complaints.
When aggrieved, individuals may choose either to ﬁle a formal complaint or ‘‘lump
it’’; to exercise ‘‘voice’’ or ‘‘exit.’’ One theory, labeled the ‘‘account model’’ by Lloyd-
Bostock and Mulcahy (1996), views complaining as ‘‘social episodes’’ (458) about percep-
tions of unfair treatment. In their study of complaints made to the National Health Service
in England about hospital care, they found that complaints often had social or nonmaterial
goals. The primary motivation for pursuing a claim was to make transgressors account for
a wrong and force them to acknowledge it. Consistent with Tyler’s notion that procedural
fairness matters, complainants sought to be understood and heard, even when the substan-
tive outcome could not be changed.
Most of the scholarly literature on welfare bureaucracies (described below) focuses on
why recipients do not complain. The few studies that explore why recipients do complain
suggest the accounting model may apply. Cowan and Halliday (2003), in their study of the
internal appeals process for homeless individuals in England who were denied housing,
found that some clients appealed to call attention to their dissatisfaction with the bureau-
cracy and expose its wrongs. Similarly, Sarat (1990), in his qualitative interviews of welfare
recipients at a legal aid ofﬁce, found that recipients asserted their legal rights to render
themselves and their needs more visible to the welfare agency. In the author’s study of
appealers and non-appealers noted above, some appealers wanted acknowledgment they
had been wronged (Lens 2007).
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Other theories highlight the role of social networks in convincing people to ﬁle com-
plaints (Mather and Yngvesson 1980–81; May and Stengel 1990). Outsiders to a dispute,
including family, friends, or community groups, shape an individual’s perception of being
wronged and what to do about it. Similar to theories emphasizing social norms in shaping
behavior, this literature suggests complaining is a ﬂuid and socially reactive process
inﬂuenced by others. The author’s study cited above (Lens 2007) lends support to this the-
ory. Virtually all of those who appealed, in contrast to those who had not, had been en-
couraged by social networks, including friends, families, fellow recipients, and community
organizations.
However, as a multistate study of appeal rates and outcomes revealed, most clients do
not appeal (Lens 2005). Appeal rates (except in New York City) are low, ranging from less
than 1% in Texas and Wisconsin to 3.5% in the rest of New York State (Lens 2005). (In
contrast appeal rates are as high as 21% in New York City.)
The most common explanation for why people do not complain, especially relevant to
welfare recipients, is a lack of power. As Lukes (2005) explains, there are different dimen-
sions of power. Sometimes the powerless will recognize a wrong but fail to act on it because
of apathy, cynicism, or alienation. Other times they will be prevented from acting through
force, threats, or manipulation. The most powerful form of powerlessness, according to
Lukes, is an internalization of dominant beliefs and values that prevent grievances from
even being named.
Thus, rather than responding to unfairness, powerless individuals may deny it exists.
This may be particularly applicable to welfare recipients. They are often in psychological
distress and stigmatized (Ensminger 1995; Goodban 1985). This may cause them to inter-
nalize blame when things go wrong. Because their expectations are low, recipients may
perceive the denial of beneﬁts as par for the course and hence not a challengeable wrong
(Coates and Penrod 1980–81). Welfare reform, which eliminated the entitlement status of
welfare and made beneﬁts harder to maintain, may further dampen the perception of being
wronged.
Even when a wrong is recognized, powerless people may still fail to complain. Wel-
fare clients have a strong incentive not to antagonize workers who can deny basic needs and
work-related resources (Diller 2000). Soss, in his qualitative study of 25 welfare recipients,
found most unwilling to complain, believing it was better to ‘‘appear appreciative, respect-
ful, and nonassertive in dealing with workers’’ (Soss 2002, 115). As Handler observes,
since such relationships are ongoing, there is ‘‘considerable potential for at least the fear,
if not the fact, of retaliation’’ (Handler 1986, 32). Skepticism may prevent complaining
where fear does not, as this author found in her study contrasting appealer and non-
appealers (Lens 2007). Clients who did not appeal viewed fair hearings, which take place
within the welfare bureaucracy, as indistinguishable from an agency seen as inﬂexible and
intractable and hence were skeptical of their usefulness.
Building on this earlier study I seek to more fully understand what motivates those
clients who do appeal and how they differ from non-appealers. I explore both the decision
to appeal and clients’ experiences at fair hearings.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This current analysis is part of a larger study on fair hearing use in welfare bureaucracies.
The ﬁrst stage was a multistate analysis of appeal rates and outcomes, followed by
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a second study comparing appealers and non-appealers, both noted above. For the latter,
I collected qualitative data and analyzed them using grounded theory, which is especially
appropriate for new areas of inquiry and for exploring individuals’ perceptions and
experiences. I interviewed 34 clients in Suffolk County, a suburban county with low ap-
peal rates similar to other counties and states. I found that the 14 non-appealers were often
aware of mistakes and were not ignorant of their appeal rights but were skeptical of the
usefulness of fair hearings. Those 20 clients who appealed had more favorable views of
the appeals process and, unlike non-appealers, had social networks that encouraged them
to appeal (Lens 2007). The purpose of the current study is to explore more fully the char-
acteristics of complainers and how they differ from the non-appealers previously studied.
In the Suffolk County study, two groups of clients were interviewed: appealers and
non-appealers. This study draws from the 34 clients interviewed in that study and 25 clients
from NewYork City, for a total of 59 clients. New York City was chosen because appealers
are more plentiful than in Suffolk County and most elsewhere. The inclusion of both a sub-
urban and urban welfare system also permits comparisons of complaining behavior and fair
hearing use in different geographical and organizational contexts. While Suffolk and New
York City operate under the same state supervised fair hearing system and laws, the latter is
a large urban bureaucracy, the former smaller, suburban, and less complex. As noted above,
appeal rates are higher in NewYork City. Clients are also more likely to win; 81% of clients
obtain relief after ﬁling a fair hearing request compared to 43% in Suffolk County (Lens and
Vorsanger 2005).
Since the Suffolk study included appealers and non-appealers, a wide array of
agencies was used to recruit participants to capture a mix of assertive and more passive
clients. Purposive sampling was used to locate clients who had received a notice denying,
discontinuing, or reducing their assistance and who had, or had not, appealed the action.
Sources for referrals included the county’s primary legal services ofﬁce for low-income
clients and various social service agencies that provided housing, employment, and crisis
intervention services. Referrals were also made by a nonproﬁt agency that assisted clients
within the welfare agency. In New York City, the primary means of recruitment was
through several community-based nonproﬁt advocacy agencies that would attract individ-
uals asserting their rights. To broaden my sample beyond clients sophisticated enough to
contact such organizations, I also recruited from a church-based soup kitchen likely to at-
tract more vulnerable and less sophisticated clients.
Because there are many reasons for denials and reductions, initial ﬁeld research fo-
cused on one type of reduction, work sanctions, to enhance the likelihood of speciﬁc themes
and patterns emerging. During ﬁeldwork, it became clear that clients’ fair hearing use is
ﬂuid and complex; the same client who failed to appeal a sanction would readily appeal
other adverse actions. Thus, the study was expanded to include other reasons for appealing,
although work sanction cases predominated.
In Suffolk County, among the non-appealers, 36% were African-American, 57%
white, and 7% Hispanic. The average age was 32. Thirty-six percent had less than a high
school education, 50% had a high school degree, and 14% attended at least some college.
Fifty percent had received assistance for 3 years or more. By contrast, appealers in Suffolk
County were more likely to be African-American, older, more educated, and spent more
time on public assistance. Speciﬁcally, 50% were African-American, 40% white, and 10%
Hispanic. The average age was 38. Twenty-ﬁve percent had less than a high school
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education, 60% had a high school degree, and 15% had attended at least some college.
Sixty-ﬁve percent had received assistance for 3 years or more.
In New York City, where only appealers were studied, 72% of the clients were
African-American, 8% white, and 20% Hispanic. The average age was 45. Thirty-two per-
cent had less than a high school education, 24% had a high school degree, and 44% had
attended at least some college.1 Eighty percent had received assistance for 3 years or more.
All but two of the Suffolk County participants were interviewed in their homes; the
New York City participants were interviewed in the researcher’s ofﬁce. Interviews lasted
approximately an hour and a half and clients were paid 25 dollars in Suffolk and thirty
dollars in New York City. (The ﬁve-dollar difference covered transportation costs for
New York City clients.) Interviews were conducted by myself and one research assistant
in Suffolk County and two in New York City. All but one of the participants agreed to be
tape-recorded. Clients were asked a series of open-ended questions that explored their gen-
eral experiences with applying for and receiving welfare, incidents involving the reduction
and discontinuance of aid, and for those who requested fair hearings, their perceptions, and
experiences of the fair hearing system. Clients were also asked general questions about
welfare reform and welfare policy.
Each interview (except the single interview that was not recorded and two interviews
where the recorder malfunctioned) was transcribed verbatim. A grounded theory approach
was used in data analysis. Grounded theory is particularly appropriate for studies, such as
this one, that involve ‘‘learn(ing) from the participants how to understand a process or sit-
uation’’ (Morse and Richards 2002, 55; Strauss 1987). This approach reduces any precon-
ceived biases, letting the data speak for themselves (Berg 1995).
Coding was conducted simultaneously with data collection and helped inform sub-
sequent interviews. The researcher coded each transcript, with descriptive codes ﬁrst at-
tached to lines of data. Focused coding was then conducted, which involved identifying the
most signiﬁcant and/or frequent line-by-line codes and choosing codes that best categorized
the emerging themes and patterns (Charmaz 2006). Coding was an iterative process, with
the researcher returning to earlier coded transcripts to conﬁrm, refute, or modify codes
as they developed. The three major categories that emerged from the coding were ‘‘strat-
egies and tactics for negotiating the bureaucracy,’’ ‘‘nature of bureaucratic relationships,’’
and ‘‘perceptions of the fair hearing experience.’’ Examples of major codes that emerged
under these categories included ‘‘failing to connect,’’ deﬁned as having a distant, nonex-
istent, unequal, or fractured relationship with an agency worker, ‘‘speaking up,’’ deﬁned as
asserting an identity based on ﬁghting for one’s needs, and ‘‘wrestling control,’’ deﬁned as
an attempt to exercise autonomy in an environment that restricts it.
Analytical memos were used throughout the process, ﬁrst to deﬁne and describe var-
ious codes and then to conduct theoretical coding, which is a way of rebuilding coded data
1 Overall, in NewYork State, 34.4% of TANF families are Hispanic, 20.8%white, and 42.3%African-American (US
Department of Health and Human Services 2004). The lower percentage of whites in the New York City sample (8%)
and higher percentage of whites in the Suffolk sample (47%) reﬂect demographic distinctions in the population
between urban New York City and suburban Suffolk County. There were some differences between the sample and the
national population in terms of age and education. For example, the average age of welfare recipients in the United
States is 31, the average age in the sample was 40 (US Department of Health and Human Services 2004). Nationally,
46% of recipients have less than a high school education (US Department of Health and Human Services 2004). In the
Suffolk and New York City sample, 29% and 32%, respectively, had less than a high school education. Thus, the
sample was older and more educated than the general welfare population.
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and establishing a conceptual framework by exploring the relationships between categories
and subcategories (Charmaz 2006). I met periodically with research assistants to discuss the
development of codes and compare and combine codes. Each transcript was coded by my-
self, and selected transcripts were coded by research assistants. Intercoder reliability of
between 80% and 90% was obtained in those transcripts coded both by a research assistant
and myself.
A limitation of this study is that it uses a relatively small sample size to explore two
large and complex bureaucracies. Respondents also were not selected randomly but based
on their use, or nonuse, of the fair hearing system after receiving an adverse notice and most
typically a sanction notice. They represent a small sliver of the population that appeals. This
study is also limited to describing the characteristics and attributes of appealers and non-
appealers as they relate to environmental and institutional factors and not their psycholog-
ical makeup, which may also inﬂuence their willingness to appeal. It also does not explore
demographic differences in the appeal population, such as race. The methodology used—
in-depth qualitative interviews—is appropriate for exploring understudied areas of research
and to understand clients’ experiences. But although this methodological approach is useful
for developing, presenting, and expanding theoretical frameworks to a new population and
new area of study, it is only a ﬁrst, and not a ﬁnal or full, glimpse of complaining behavior in
welfare bureaucracies.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Disputes between clients and workers occur at any stage. They become formalized and
subject to appeal when the agency issues an adverse notice denying, discontinuing, or re-
ducing the client’s grant. In the vast majority of cases, in both Suffolk and New York City,
clients’ grants were reduced because of a work sanction, typically the failure to attend
a work-related activity, such as a Department of Labor appointment or training session.
Thus, they did not involve complex disputes about clients’ overall work behaviors but bu-
reaucratic disputes over missed appointments. Other types of notices included discontin-
uances for failing to produce documents or attend appointments related to recertiﬁcation. In
a few cases, clients challenged the adequacy of their public assistance grants. Clients’ de-
cisions to contest these decisions were inﬂuenced by their perceptions of how workers
treated them, their reactions to powerlessness, and stigma and by social networks, espe-
cially client networks.
Evaluating the Fairness of Bureaucratic Decision Making
How bureaucratic decisions are made are as signiﬁcant as the decision itself. Citizens assess
whether government ofﬁcials are impartial and listen to them. Social niceties, such as po-
liteness and respect, have symbolic meaning; they signal to citizens that their input is val-
ued. If not given an opportunity to speak before a decision is made, citizens are less likely to
view the decision as fair. Conversely, if they believe their views were considered, they are
likely to view even unfavorable outcomes as fair (Tyler 2006).
A reoccurring theme in virtually every interview with clients in Suffolk and NewYork
City, including appealers and non-appealers, was their perception they were not listened to.
They described welfare relationships that were distant and fractured rather than personal
and ongoing. Most could not respond readily with a name when asked about their
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caseworker. After being asked what he thought about his caseworker, Richard replied ‘‘I’ve
been on this for over a year and if she was any good I would remember her name.’’2 Sarah
jocularly stated ‘‘I don’t even know if there’s a lady by that name.’’ Clients would some-
times resort to the generic and disembodied ‘‘they’’ rather than the personalized ‘‘he’’ or
‘‘she’’ when describing their welfare relationships, as when Steven complained, ‘‘It’s like
they have full control over you, full control over your children.’’ (emphasis supplied)
This disconnect was by bureaucratic design; both New York City and Suffolk con-
structed systems shielding workers from clients and limiting access. Both made heavy use
of receptionists for deﬂecting clients away from workers. Gaining access required persis-
tence, as Alice described the process ‘‘you have to keep working, keep working to get to
them.’’ In Suffolk, most communication was in writing through ‘‘speedy requests.’’ Clients
who wanted to speak with their workers were asked to write their request on a written
memo. They would then sit and wait in the reception area until they received a written
response. These written interactions could go on for days and involve multiple speedy re-
quests passed back and forth. In both counties, lines were busy and phone calls went unre-
turned. In Suffolk County, workers’ direct phone lines were sometimes withheld from
clients. As Paula summed it up, ‘‘it’s really hard to get in contact with your caseworker,
they act like they’re the President.’’
Clients’ perceptions of workers as faceless and unknowable were reinforced in their
brief interactions with workers in both counties. As Mary explains, ‘‘they’ll see you for all
of a lousy ﬁve minutes. If they see you for ten minutes you’re there for a long time.’’ Meet-
ings were described as rushed and impersonal and workers as harsh, cold, and lacking em-
pathy. Denise explains, ‘‘it felt like a machinery, there was no humane contact. It was as if
they tried to have minimal contact with you as they could . . . they just want to deal with
documentation.’’ Susan echoed her description ‘‘They just let computers do the work.’’
Carol explained ‘‘it was more like pushing papers and get out of the ofﬁce.’’ Mary stated
‘‘it’s like you’re a number.’’
Decision making was also dispersed, with other workers, such as Department of Labor
employees and welfare to work contractors, deciding when clients had violated the work
rules. Thus, although workers had considerable discretionary power over clients’ cases,
how decisions were made, and who made it, was often unclear to clients. Clients insistence
that they did not know their worker’s name was often more ﬁgurative than literal, sym-
bolizing a generalized frustration and annoyance with an impenetrable bureaucracy. Its
often Byzantine and immoveable nature made it difﬁcult for clients to pin down who
was at fault or responsible when things went wrong. Consequently, clients were unsure
who to plead their case to or who would listen.
Clients also viewed the system as capricious and arbitrary and prone to error. Virtually
every client interviewed in both counties thought their cases were handled incorrectly and
complained of improperly applied work sanctions, incorrect budgets, or wrongful discon-
tinuances based on misdirected notices. When pressed during the interviews to identify
ways the agency had helped them, clients framed their examples as exceptions, as random
acts of bureaucratic kindness rather than business as usual.
In short, clients in both counties appeared perpetually aggrieved. In their view, the
essential elements of fair treatment were missing. The ability to present their views
2 To protect the conﬁdentiality of the participants all names are pseudonyms.
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was cut short by a lack of contact or the brevity of their encounters with workers. Workers
were perceived as the antithesis of impartial, making up their minds without access to suf-
ﬁcient information. Clients believed they could do little to inﬂuence their worker and secure
better treatment. As Gerdy explained, talking to your worker was ‘‘like talking to the
wind.’’
Despite their frustration with workers, clients did not personally blame them. Rather
they depersonalized these relationships, attributing problems to the ‘‘system’’ or the
vagaries of human behavior. Workers were rude or dismissive because they were having
a ‘‘bad day,’’ not because they personally disliked the client. Indeed, as several explained,
welfare clients (although not themselves) were often a difﬁcult bunch, thus it was not un-
reasonable for workers to treat them harshly. Workers were stressed, handling too many
cases, or looking to evade work or pass the buck. But whether overworked or avoiding
work, it was the system that created disgruntled workers.
Thus to clients, workers’ impersonal and abrupt approach was emblematic of larger
systemic problems. They judged the system as the sum of its parts, excusing their workers
individual behavior, while concluding that overall the welfare bureaucracy did not give
them a fair shake. Such a ﬁnding is consistent with the extensive literature cited above
describing the negative bureaucratic environment of many welfare agencies. It was a per-
ception shared by non-appealers and appealers alike; all described and experienced the
welfare bureaucracy in similar ways.
Choosing to Complain or Not
Why do some clients choose not to appeal, whereas other equally as aggrieved clients do?
As noted above, powerlessness is likely to suppress complaints, and most welfare recipients
do not complain. ‘‘Getting along’’ is the more common response, with welfare clients, as
depicted in the literature, acting strategically passive to avoid upsetting workers, who may
retaliate against them for complaining (Soss 2002). Even if retaliation is not feared, skep-
ticism may take its place.
The non-appealers in this study exhibited both fear and skepticism but mostly the
latter. Some clients feared angering their workers; they did not want to ‘‘cause trouble’’
or ‘‘rufﬂe feathers.’’ As Barbara explained, ‘‘if you get on their bad side’’ your beneﬁts
might be ‘‘cut off.’’ But more commonly, even among the fearful, clients expressed res-
ignation. As Shauna explained when asked why she did not appeal her sanction, ‘‘I just feel
like it’s just a waste . . . I get frustrated . . . it’s just never gonna change.’’ Or as Penny put it
more bluntly, hearings were a ‘‘bunch of bullshit.’’ Clients did not feel heard by their
workers and, unlike their appealing counterparts described below, believed they would
not be heard in the fair hearing room. They perceived their workers and hearings as in-
distinguishable and unbeatable. As Maureen explained, ‘‘you’re not going to win against
social services.’’ Barbara believed ‘‘they all side together.’’
Thus, instead of challenging a system they perceived as unfair, they opted out. ‘‘Ap-
plication fatigue’’ set in, with acquiescence the easier route. As Valerie explained, ‘‘I’m just
too disgusted, just aggravated. So I didn’t want to do it.’’ Likewise Maureen explained she
didn’t appeal because ‘‘everything with them is a long and tedious process.’’ Nor did such
clients reach out to social networks or contacts that might have counteracted their ennui and
alienation. When asked by the interviewer whether they had discussed the decision to ap-
peal with others, virtually all the non-appealers reported they had not. As Mindy explained,
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‘‘I don’t really tell everybody I’m on social services.’’ Some, like Penny, ‘‘never heard
[about] anybody use[ing]’’ hearings and thus believed they were not worth the effort.
Appealers in both Suffolk County and NewYork City differed from their more passive
counterparts in several ways. They were less fearful and dependent on workers, viewing
workers as antagonists to be challenged rather than placated. They also managed the stigma
and powerlessness of welfare by engaging and challenging the system, rather than acqui-
escing to it. Finally, they relied on social networks, often other clients, to support their
decision to appeal.
Redefining the Worker-Client Relationship
Welfare relationships are relationships of dependency, with clients relying on workers to
provide for basic needs. Such relationships are typically characterized by submissiveness
and the fear that complaining would trigger retaliation (Handler 1986; Soss 2002). As noted
above, the non-appealers in this study either did not want to rock the boat or did not feel it
was worth rocking. In contrast, appealers redeﬁned their relationships, seeing workers as
someone who could hurt rather than help them. To such clients, complaining was a defen-
sive maneuver that forestalled problems rather than creating them. As Diane explained,
complaining prevented you from being ‘‘put through the system.’’ Laura explained, ‘‘if
you let them walk all over you that’s what they’re gonna do.’’ Kate echoed her sentiments:
‘‘If you never speak up, you can never win.’’
To such clients, retaliation was not an issue, not being noticed or heard was. This
attitude was best summed up by Paula who explained that complaining was a nothing
to lose proposition: ‘‘what are they gonna do, call the cops on me? Or not help me that
day? What are they gonna do? You know I really don’t care. I mean they can’t do much
more than what they’ve already done.’’ Complaining gave clients another bite of the apple
or as Mara explained, ‘‘If I appeal . . . I get more of a chance than just letting them say no.’’
To these clients, dealing with the bureaucracy required assertiveness not acquiescence.
While complaining took many forms, from ‘‘talking back’’ to workers to climbing the
bureaucratic hierarchy, clients turned to fair hearings when these approaches failed. Filing
an appeal was also arguably the safest avenue because it did not require a personal con-
frontation with a worker. Sandy described fair hearings as a way to avoid an angry con-
frontation, and possible retaliation, from her worker: ‘‘There are times when you are so
angry and frustrated that you want to lash out. But if you do anything disrespectful . . .
case closed by mistake. So if you don’t know anything about a fair hearing or stuff like
that you’re screwed.’’ Hearings acted as a safety valve for such clients, channeling their
anger away for their worker.
For most clients, appealing was an act divorced from already tenuous relationships
with workers; it was the proper bureaucratic response to being treated bureaucratically.
A depersonalized bureaucracy, where blame was diffused and client worker interactions
unstable or anonymous, created an environment conducive to ﬁling formal complaints.
Clients often expressed puzzlement when asked by the interviewer how their workers
reacted to the appeal. Caught in a bureaucratic maze of red tape themselves, they assumed,
correctly or not, their workers would not even know they had appealed. To clients, appeals
had little to do with their worker. As Mara explained, ‘‘they don’t have nothing else to do
about it,’’ once you appeal. Susan pointed out, ‘‘they still have their job’’ if you appeal,
whereas Lettie explained, ‘‘I don’t think that they’d even care if they knew.’’ Fears of
reprisal were dismissed; when asked if she feared retaliation for complaining Louise
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responded: ‘‘no, no, no, no, no, because they have the right to retaliate you could just do it
too’’ (by reporting them to the Commissioners’ ofﬁce).
In several instances, it was the client’s worker who advised appealing. Whether sug-
gested to deﬂect clients’ concerns or avoid confrontation, it conﬁrmed the appropriateness
of appealing and of viewing workers as adversaries. Other clients viewed workers as forc-
ing them to appeal; had their workers been more accessible and attentive, they believed, the
dispute could have been resolved. As Lloyd explained, it was his worker who ‘‘forc[ed] me
to have a hearing, because I wasn’t given a chance to explain to her.’’ Similarly, Sharon
explained, hearings were necessary because otherwise ‘‘they make a mistake and you pay
for it.’’ For Joyce, hearings ‘‘were the most immediate remedy that’s gotten any result
for me.’’
In short, clients saw their relationship with workers as not repairable. Unlike more
passive clients, whose goal is to pacify their workers, they gave up on these relationships,
viewing workers as apathetic or adversarial but not as allies. Instead of fearing them, they
sought to override them. They viewed hearings as a second chance that protected them from
workers they perceived as arbitrary. This occurred in both New York City and Suffolk
County, thus suggesting that the nature and structure of relationships, and not necessarily
the size or complexity of the organization, produce this effect in some clients.
Managing Stigma and Powerlessness
Appealers also differed in the way they managed welfare stigma and their own powerless-
ness. Instead of internalizing images of helplessness and incompetence, appealers projected
outward, reciting a litany of the agency’s mistakes rather than focusing on their own. In
contrast to the more compliant and submissive noncomplainers, who, as described above,
preferred laying low and disengaging from the welfare system, appealers constructed a con-
ception of self with speaking up at its core.
This occurred in both counties, although clients from New York City stated it more
forcefully. For example, Susan explained, ‘‘I’m the type of person that I just speak mymind
. . . I make it my business to put people in their place. So yes I domake complaints. I’ll be on
the phone with everyone from morning till the afternoon.’’ Denise described herself as
‘‘relentless. That is the best description as to how to describe me. Relentless, when I felt
like my rights were violated I could be relentless to defend myself.’’ Louise, using the lingo
of the market place, elevated herself from lowly welfare client to a customer, noting, ‘‘The
customer is always right. You are supposed to service your client. Customer service is
job one.’’
To reinforce the impression they were ‘‘ﬁghters,’’ clients accompanied these decla-
rations with anecdotes of how they challenged their worker or corrected a mistake. Susan
described how she got her worker to reverse the decision to send her to work after the birth
of her child. Denise told a similar tale of being reassigned to another work assignment after
strongly protesting her original one. Through such stories, clients depicted themselves as
autonomous and capable individuals able to subvert embedded power hierarchies.
Thus, complaining served both instrumental and expressive purposes. It not only
(sometimes) ﬁxed the problem but also altered clients’ perceptions of their marginality
and vulnerability. Louise is one such example. She explained how she was ﬁrst ‘‘hospi-
table’’ to workers, who were in turn ‘‘nasty’’ and ‘‘ignorant’’ and stereotyped her as lazy.
She initially thought she was at fault: ‘‘I’m putting all the blame on myself’’ and then de-
cides that while ‘‘they’ll pretend it’s you’’ it has little to do with her. She starts to complain
Lens Seeking Justice 827
after concluding, ‘‘You don’t treat me like I treat you then, I’m gonna say something about
it.’’ Through complaining she reframed her experience, reproaching workers instead of
herself.
Other clients made a similar connection between asserting their rights and afﬁrming
their dignity. Diane explained, ‘‘they feel you’re less than because you are on social ser-
vices. But I let them know I am somebody.’’ Richard said, ‘‘They don’t show no respect at
all. I mean, I demand mine, ‘cause I let them know you know I put my pants on, or my shoes
on the same way you put yours on, you know? And I’m not gonna tolerate you talking to me
in the wrong way.’’
Clients also used their identity as complainers to distinguish themselves from other
clients. They were quick to describe other clients as timid, ignorant, and fearful, whereas
they were bold, demanding, and knowledgeable. Distancing oneself from fellow clients
is a common tactic for managing stigma in welfare bureaucracies because it allows cli-
ents to reject negative stereotypes as inapplicable to them (Briar 1966; Soss 2005).
Through such distinctions, clients afﬁrm their normalcy and kinship with the non-welfare
population (Soss 2005). By describing other clients as uneducated and unsophisticated
in handling the bureaucracy, clients extend the social distance between them. Unlike
other clients, they were more like the average citizen who knows how to negotiate with
government.
As Lukes (2005) observes, powerlessness typically reinforces itself, breeding alien-
ation, skepticism, and denial. It is more likely to produce the passive welfare recipient than
the complaining one. Appealers broke this mold, attempting to subvert, rather than suc-
cumb, to power hierarchies. They projected a sense of agency, believing they could inﬂu-
ence and alter agency decisions. Unlike their noncomplaining counterparts, they engaged
the system. Paradoxically, although they spoke loudly and disparagingly of the system, they
also had more faith that it could be changed. In short, they did not succumb to the ennui or
alienation of the powerlessness; instead they chose agitation over apathy.
Appealing also served other purposes beyond correcting perceived wrongs. As Lloyd-
Bostock and Mulcahy (1996) explain, complaining is sometimes best characterized as
a ‘‘social episode’’ that can serve the noninstrumental purposes of ‘‘having been under-
stood, taken seriously, and offered a satisfactory explanation (459).’’ A running theme
throughout clients’ talk was the desire to be heard, acknowledged, and respected, which
they believed was withheld by distant workers and bureaucratic barriers. The format of
hearings required the agency (and hearing ofﬁcer) to listen to their complaints.
Lloyd-Bostock and Mulcahy (1996) note that complaining is also a way to expose
perceived institutional wrongs and to call the agency to account. This form of complaining
was illustrated by Sandy andMandy. For Sandy, fair hearings allowed you to ‘‘tell about the
system that is broken.’’ Mandy made even more explicit the accountability function of
hearings. She explained how she told her hearing ofﬁcer ‘‘they have to investigate because
they keep messing with people. You tell the people in Albany [the state capital where the
stage agency is located] they need to send an investigator down here.’’
In sum, for appealers hearings served several purposes. It allowed them to see them-
selves as engaged, competent citizens able to play the bureaucracy’s game. It gave them
a platform from which to speak and be heard, to address problems of process, not just sub-
stance. Finally, in perhaps the penultimate act of overcoming the self-blame of the power-
less, it allowed them to publicly ﬁnger the system as the culprit, rather than themselves.
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Creating Complaint Networks
Appealers also differed from non-appealers in their willingness to talk with others about
their problems with welfare. As noted above, non-appealers in Suffolk County spoke about
their decision to appeal with virtually no one. In contrast, appealers in both Suffolk County
and New York City reported reaching out to social and professional networks. Clients
reported multiple contacts with a wide range of networks, from politicians, to social
workers, and to local community groups. These individuals and groups encouraged them
to appeal and provided advice and support.
Some of clients’ strongest networks were with other clients. Clients viewed one an-
other as a lifeline, giving and receiving tips on surviving the welfare encounter. AsMaureen
describes
I actually learned more through friends of mine—if that’s what you want to call them, they are
friends of mine—who have been through the system, you know, you learn more that way than
asking these people and trying to get a straight answer.
Sarah similarly describes her connections with other clients and how she helps them:
There’s a lot of people down there that you have a camaraderie with even though you don’t
know them ‘cause they’re going through what you’re going through. Like you’ll go in there
and when you walk out they’re like, ‘did you get it? Did you get it?’ you know it’s like,
everybody’s in the same boat, we all understand each other without even saying anything. I’ll
go to HEAP a lot ‘cause I can’t afford to pay my electric and my gas and, there’ll be people
down there, oh, you know ‘how do you ﬁll out this form’ or whatever—and I’ll tell them, you
know ‘this is what I’ve learned . . . You give them little tips.
Paula describes herself as at the hub of a client network, the ‘‘go to’’ person when
people have problems:
as soon as they have a problem the phone rings and, ‘oh, what am I supposed to do with these
people at social services, they told me that I can’t get this.’ Well they lied to you. You go back
down there, you apply again, they have to help everybody no matter what.
Although such networks were more evident in New York City than Suffolk, they
worked in similar ways. They were often instrumental in encouraging reticent, newer,
or less knowledgeable clients to complain. Raymond, for example, described how a fellow
client, who overheard his dispute with a worker who refused him emergency housing, ad-
vised him to request a fair hearing.
As Mather and Yngvesson (1980–81) emphasize, disputes happen in a social milieu.
Other parties can inﬂuence how an individual responds to a perceived wrong, including
whether a disputes is escalated or diffused. In this study, social networks, and in particular
client networks, validated clients’ complaints, while also helping clients overcome the
skepticism and inertia that often beset powerless people in difﬁcult bureaucratic environ-
ments. Other clients and outside networks served as a counterbalance to clients’ often-
contentious relationships with workers, suggesting and validating some remedies, such
as appealing, over others.
Assessing the Fairness of Fair Hearings
In contrast to client worker interactions where clients’ concerns can be deﬂected, hearings
are structured to provide clients with an opportunity to be heard in a neutral forum. Both the
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client and the agency appear in person, although the latter is not the caseworker that made
the decision but an agency representative assigned full time to hearings. Both have an op-
portunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. Hearings are presided over by
a hearing ofﬁcer designated by the state. A written decision is required.
As they did with their workers, clients looked for certain markers of fairness. They
had ﬁrm notions of fairness, deﬁning it as studies have found most citizens do: the op-
portunity to speak, have their views considered by an impartial decision maker acting in
good faith, and to be treated with respect (Tyler 2006). As Lucy explained, in a ‘‘nutshell’’
fairness meant being ‘‘given the opportunity to say what I have to say and replying to
me in a decent manner and treating me as a human being.’’ In both their search for im-
partiality and an opportunity to present their case, hearings sometimes, but not always, fell
short.
Looking for Impartiality
The relationship between the hearing unit and the local welfare ofﬁce proved problematic to
clients. Although the players were new (the agency representative and the hearing ofﬁcer
are unknown to the client), hearings stand within the welfare bureaucracy, not outside it.
The relationship between the two is less distinct, for example, than between the police and
the court system. The state welfare bureaucracy, who has supervisory responsibility over
local ofﬁces and generates many of the rules clients are challenging, conducts hearings.
Clients generally appear without an attorney, thus their experiences are unmediated by
an outside third party. Hearings are thus a continuation of an existing bureaucratic relation-
ship already characterized by low social status, powerlessness, and stigma. Although parity
between parties in adversarial proceedings is never assured, welfare clients virtually always
enter the hearing room in a subordinate and disadvantaged position and unsure of the
impartiality of the hearing ofﬁcer.
Clients were often unclear of the precise relationship between the hearing ofﬁcer and
the agency representative. Hence, they closely scrutinized these relationships for signs of
partiality. Seemingly minor details, such as entering a room where the hearing ofﬁcer and
agency representative are already sitting, contributed to clients’ doubts that the decision
maker was neutral. The easy familiarity clients sensed between the hearing ofﬁcer and
agency representative, who worked together daily, also elicited distrust. As Lila explained
I’m coming in, and they’re already in the room, they’re already talking to each other and, they
know each other, of course.
How can you tell?
They’re calling each other by ﬁrst names, they’re laughing. I’m nervous, you know, I’m not in
this atmosphere as they are. Honestly, I’m the enemy and they’re the—they’re friends.
OK, so when you walk in you feel that, from the start?
You feel the tension, yeah. And then when I come in, then they, ‘alright, we’re here on the
case of Miss R., versus the Department of Soc’—you know and it’s like, oh I know I’m gonna
lose.
Along with impartiality, clients focused on the tone of the hearings, often connecting
the two. As Tyler observes (2006), respect and politeness are central to perceptions of fair-
ness. It ‘‘sends a message about one’s standing in a social group’’ (Tyler 2006, 150), sig-
naling one’s worth and value as a citizen. Conversely, treating someone rudely and
impolitely signiﬁes social exclusion and low status.
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Clients’ harshest encounters, in New York City and Suffolk, were typically with the
agency representative, who often questioned them more aggressively than the hearing
ofﬁcer. Most clients described agency representatives pejoratively, using such terms as
‘‘rude’’, ‘‘callous’’, or ‘‘nasty.’’ They felt demeaned by these interactions. As Denise
explained, ‘‘they try and make me look stupid . . . very accusatory and very disrespectful.’’
Steven described how the agency representative ‘‘was trying to really just makeme feel like
I ain’t trying to do nothing. You know, like I’m a drug addict . . . that’s how he made me
feel. You, know because I know I don’t have the nice clothes.’’ Lucy complained that ‘‘they
always looked angry’’ whereas Wendy said, they ‘‘treated her like a low life.’’ To clients,
the agency representative’s harsh and unremitting adversarial style signaled disrespect. It
replicated their treatment at the welfare center and eroded expectations that the hearing
room would be different than the welfare ofﬁce.
It also created doubts about the hearing ofﬁcers’ impartiality when he or she failed to
alter the tone or, as one client put it, make sure that the agency representative was ‘‘pro-
fessional, [and] mind[ed] [their]manners.’’ Denise, who won her hearings, nevertheless
described them as unfair because of her perception that the hearing ofﬁcer was too passive.
As she explained, the hearing ofﬁcer ‘‘let HRA run you over. They step back . . . it is like
you watching somebody committing a crime and you say nothing, you just let it happen.
They just sit there . . . they playing passive, makes you feel like the judge is out to let them
run over you and say nothing, you know.’’ Alice echoed her complaint that the hearing
ofﬁcer was not really impartial because ‘‘they don’t say much. They should say more. They
should be, they should be the ones really like to ask the questions.’’ To such clients, hearing
ofﬁcers ceded their authority as an impartial decision maker when they failed to restrain the
agency representative.
As the above examples illustrate, the hearing ofﬁcer’s style and demeanor were of cen-
tral concern to clients. When hearing ofﬁcers played a more active role, clients were more
likely to perceive their hearings as fair. By directing questions to both sides equally and re-
spectfully, hearing ofﬁcers reinforced their impartiality, and clients weremore likely to con-
clude that the decision was based on the facts, and not the party’s status. As Russ explained
after describing a hearing with an active and attentive hearing ofﬁcer, outcomes ‘‘depend on
the case. You know, if I go in there, and like I’m going in there for nonsense, he’s gonna back
themupmore . . . If he sees that you’re in the right and theyactuallydid thiswrong, theydidn’t
follow their own rules, he’ll go on your favor and he’ll actually go down on them.’’
Impartial, polite, and respectful hearing ofﬁcers generated trust in the process. They
provided what Tyler (2006) calls a ‘‘cushion of support’’ against complaints of unfairness
even when the outcomes were unfavorable (99). Clients were more likely to describe hear-
ings as fair if these elements were present, even when they lost. Louise is one such example.
As she explained ‘‘at least you can get a word in edgewise’’ [at hearings] and the hearing
ofﬁcer will ‘‘actually ask the agency a real question.’’ Because she thought she was treated
fairly and listened to, she accepted even her losses, explaining ‘‘you know everything is not
gonna go your way all the time, you know you got the good as well as the bad.’’ Jane also
distinguished between substantive outcomes and the hearing process. Because her hearing
ofﬁcer actively questioned her and the agency representative, she concluded that even if she
had lost her hearing, she thought it was fair.
In contrast, clients who described the hearing process as unfair had doubts about
the hearing ofﬁcer’s neutrality. Some believed that hearings were for ‘‘show’’ and
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the decision preordained against the recipient. Connie is one such example. Her beneﬁts
were cut when an agency appointment conﬂicted with a postsurgical doctor’s appoint-
ment. Told to keep her answers simple during the hearing, she concluded that the ‘‘judges
mind was made up before [she] came in the room.’’ She viewed the judge as an advocate
for the state who wanted to ‘‘keep contributions in the state.’’ She was convinced that
there was a ‘‘quota of people’’ eligible for beneﬁts and that she had ‘‘hit the quota.’’ She
did not see the hearing ofﬁcer as neutral or impartial, in part because she did not, in her
view, allow her enough time to speak. Others with similar complaints like Paula, believed
‘‘it was just all social services, there’s nobody outside of social services.’’ Gloria believed
‘‘they’re just for the system that group works together and their job is not to give people
money.’’
In sum, impartiality was a key concern of clients, as it is with most citizens when
evaluating the fairness of legal authorities. But unlike other legal forums, the distinction
between their adversary—the agency—and the decision maker was not always clear. Cli-
ents entered the hearing room suspicious of the hearing ofﬁcer’s impartiality. Whether
hearing ofﬁcers stuck to the legal formalities was less important than their tone, style,
and demeanor. Clients were more apt to use the latter as markers of impartiality.
Looking to be Heard
Like most legal proceedings, hearings focus on evidence, in the form of written documents
and oral testimony. How their evidence and testimony was treated inﬂuenced clients’ per-
ceptions of whether they had an opportunity to present their case. Both proved problematic
for clients.
Clients commonly believed that their word was not equivalent to the agency’s. As
Alice explained, in a ‘‘he-said she said’’ rendition of what occurred, the agency was more
apt to be believed. Kate concurred, ‘‘they usually go by the word of the other worker, and
not you, unless you have the documentation . . . they can have nothing either, but they’ll
take their word over yours, which I don’t like.’’
Written evidence proved even more elusive for clients. The coin of the realm, both for
the welfare bureaucracy and fair hearings, is written documents. As Miller and Holstein
(1996) explain, documentation, or the reduction of every transaction into a written form, is
standard fare for bureaucracies and take on a concrete reality even though they are a ‘‘par-
tisan account’’ of events (9). The same is true for legal forums, which often rely on the
written word to conﬁrm the spoken. Several clients had an almost simple faith in the power
of documents, especially when they were able to secure them. Lucy, nervous before her
hearing, ‘‘look[ed] at the envelope’’ (proving she had received a notice of appointment late)
to reassure herself and build her conﬁdence. Similarly, Arlene knew ‘‘in her heart she would
win’’ because ‘‘anybody in their right mind would see that it was not my fault’’ when she
showed them that her recertiﬁcation letter was sent to the wrong address.
However, for most clients, documentary evidence posed a challenge and put them at
a structural disadvantage. The bureaucracy’s business is to know about clients and to record
what they know, establishing a documentary ﬁle that clients cannot duplicate or compete
with. As Louise describes, echoing a common sentiment, ‘‘we’re very ill-prepared when we
go there . . . they got a folder on us they know all about. Other than the notice—what’s on
the notice—I don’t have any particulars, or any supporting depositions, or any folder, or
nothing.’’ Debbie explained how clients are ‘‘bombarded, because they come out with all
these papers, saying you haven’t done this, you haven’t done that, and you know, giving
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a breakdown of your history and you’re so unprepared that you’re like, oh my gosh, what
am I to do?’’
Clients paid close attention to how their evidence stocked up against the agency’s and
even how long the hearing ofﬁcer looked at it. Louise was disturbed because ‘‘they didn’t
really look at my documents.’’ As she explained ‘‘I took everything [the agency] gave for
me to look at and read over, but why can’t you look at what I’m trying to get you to see.’’
Amy had a similar experience. While she won her hearing, she thought they just brushed
[her evidence] to the side,’’ and suggested that each person should have ‘‘the same amount
of time to show their evidence.’’ Connie was puzzled because the hearing ofﬁcer returned
her documents without copying them; as she explained ‘‘when he wasn’t accepting the
documentation that I had so that’s when I . . . felt this is a lose-lose here.’’ Such clients
were sometime unaware of evidentiary rules and why some evidence was more relevant
than others. However, accurately or not, and whether they won or lost their hearings, they
perceived the application of such rules as denying them the opportunity to present their case
and hence unfair.
Clients who thought their documentation was more thoroughly reviewed were more
likely to describe their hearings as fair and impartial. Ned, who was sanctioned for not
attending a work appointment, obtained a letter from the homeless shelter he resided in
documenting mail delivery problems. When the hearing ofﬁcer focused on the letter,
Ned described him as ‘‘very business like. He did his job just like a judge.’’ Richard also
believed his documentary evidence (letters from physicians describing his disability) was
carefully considered and describe his hearing similarly: ‘‘they’re very honest in their de-
cisions and fair in their decisions, they look at all the documentation, they listen to you, and
based on the evidence you present them, I think they did a good job in evaluating the
evidence, and they were appropriate.’’
Although most clients had a pragmatic approach to hearings, viewing it as a forum for
correcting mistakes, some clients, mostly in Suffolk County, misconstrued the purpose of
hearings. They viewed hearings as a forum for pleading an exception to the rules. They saw
it as an opportunity to explain their unique and individual circumstances and were surprised
when the hearing ofﬁcer refused to set aside the law. As Paula explained, ‘‘it was just ev-
erything by the book’’ and the hearing ofﬁcer was going to follow the rules ‘‘no matter what
I said.’’ Using the language of the law to criticize it, Sarah complained her ‘‘rights were
totally violated’’ when the hearing ofﬁcer simply explained the law (on Supplemental Se-
curity Income budgeting rules) and refused to change them for her. Other clients, in both
counties, viewed hearings as a catchall for resolving all their complaints against the welfare
department, thus misconstruing the linearity and speciﬁcity of the appeal system.
Over time, clients becamemore skilled at hearings.They learned the logic of the lawand
the difference between legal testimony and ordinary conversation. Relational accounts that
emphasized social context and feelings gaveway tomore linear and limited explanations.As
Conley and O’Barr (1990) have found, legal discourse is different than social discourse and
may be particularly challenging for women, minorities, and the poor, who often rely on re-
lational and expressive ways of talking. Several clients learned this lesson, and when asked
what advice they would give clients at fair hearings, how to talk topped the list. As Arlene
explained, it was important to ‘‘stay directly on subject and don’t put anything personal into
it.’’Amy, echoing her advice, said ‘‘Don’t go in there like youhate theworld.’’Acting ‘‘busi-
nesslike,’’ Joyce explained, ‘‘puts you at their level, not beneath them.’’
Lens Seeking Justice 833
In sum, hearings were a mixed bag for clients. Inequities below were replicated in the
hearing room, where clients perceived themselves as outmatched and overpowered, the odd
man out among the repeat players, the hearing ofﬁcers, and agency representatives who
worked together daily. The forceful and domineering style of the agency representatives,
cited by most clients, and the failure of hearing ofﬁcers to sometimes restrain them, raised
suspicions of unfairness. Although hearings were presented as a forum for scrutinizing the
agency’s decisions, in practice it was clients who often ended up scrutinized. Clients per-
ceived commonly observed norms of politeness and respect, ritualized in other adversarial
settings such as courtrooms, as sometimes lacking.
On the other hand, for several clients, hearings were their ﬁrst opportunity to fully air
their grievances to authorities. They were able to adapt to the legal systems demands, pro-
ducing evidence and testimony to support their cases. Hearing ofﬁcers who paid attention to
such nonlegal factors as the tone and style of the questioning and whether clients were
treated politely and courteously created environments perceived as fair by clients. As sev-
eral clients’ attested, procedural fairness was possible to achieve, despite the evident power
and status disparities between the parties.
IMPLICATIONS
Hearings perform an important function within welfare bureaucracies. They not only cor-
rect agency error but also reveal organizational problems. Clients’ perpetual state of griev-
ance in both counties suggests that appealing served expressive as well as instrumental
purposes. Clients appealed not only because of a perceived mistake but also, consistent
with the accounting model of complaining noted above, to expose perceived wrongs to
a larger audience. When bureaucratic interactions become routinized and impersonal, cli-
ents will seek other venues for relief and attention. Appeals are one such forum and serve as
a substitute for the personalized attention lacking in worker client interactions. The value of
personalized and individualized front line interactions, especially when implementing wel-
fare reform’s behavior-based changes, is well known (Bloom, Hill, and Riccio 2001). This
study suggests it could also reduce appeals.
The ﬁndings also suggest speciﬁc changes for improving worker-client interactions.
Clients perceived that the basic ingredients of fairness, including respect and an opportunity
to be heard without prejudgment, were missing in their interactions with workers. Although
somemight contend that harsh treatment is necessary to motivate clients or deter them from
welfare, a process perceived as fair would likely increase clients’ cooperation and com-
pliance. Fair treatment bolsters conﬁdence in government, and citizens are more likely to
comply and respect the law if authorities act evenly, in good faith, and courteously (Tyler
2006). This applies both in the hearing room and in everyday interactions with government
ofﬁcials.
This study describes a different type of welfare client than found in past research,
which depicted welfare clients as unaware of mistakes and passive and fearful of retaliation
from their caseworkers if they complain (Gilliom 2001; Handler 1986; Soss 2002). This
study’s ﬁndings suggest that some welfare clients can overcome what Lukes (2005) de-
scribes as the most insidious form of powerlessness: failing to even recognize a grievance.
Instead of deﬁning themselves as their workers did, clients learned over time, and often
from each other, how to challenge the system, not passively acquiesce to it. To manage the
stigma and psychological distress of being on welfare, they focused on the bureaucracies’
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errors, rather than their own, while also differentiating themselves from other clients who
did not speak up for themselves.
Although this study focused on environmental and institutional factors and not demo-
graphics, it suggests some future areas of research for the latter. As noted above, appealers
in Suffolk County were more likely than non-appealers to be African-American. New York
City, which has the highest appeal rate in New York State, has a higher proportion of
African-Americans than other counties in NewYork State (US Census Bureau 2000). Thus,
further research is needed to explore the connection between ethnicity and appeal rates.
Other demographic factors, such as education, age, and length of welfare use, also need
to be explored.
Another question left unanswered by this study is why, given the bureaucratic envi-
ronment, more clients do not appeal, especially in Suffolk County. Despite the difference in
size and complexity of the bureaucracy, clients in Suffolk and New York City had similar
bureaucratic experiences and similar explanations for what motivated their appeal. How-
ever, they had somewhat different experiences at their hearings. Although several clients
were satisﬁed with their hearings in Suffolk County, they were also more likely to describe
their hearings as unfair. Thus, they may hesitate to appeal again, as New York City clients
often do. Overall, clients in Suffolk County—both appealers and non-appealers—were
more skeptical of the system (Lens 2007). A probable reason for this skepticism is that
Suffolk County clients are more likely to lose their hearings. As noted above, they are half
as likely as New York City clients to obtain relief through fair hearings. Social networks
and especially client networks, which inﬂuence decisions to appeal, are likely communi-
cating this fact, thus resulting in fewer appeals.
The ﬁndings suggest some ways to improve fair hearings. Hearing ofﬁcers could con-
sciously and deliberately create a more inviting environment. Hearing ofﬁcers set the tone
and style of the hearing, with other actors taking their cue from them. Those who struck
a balance between letting clients complain in their own way while keeping the hearing fo-
cused on relevant legal and factual issues created an atmosphere where clients felt heard.
Hearing ofﬁcers who actively asserted control over the agency representatives also created
a more impartial atmosphere, with clients placed on a more equal footing with their adver-
sary. Such clients were more likely to describe their hearings as fair, even when they lost.
Clients’ inherent disadvantages in the hearing room also need to be addressed. Many
had difﬁculty securing documentation from uncooperative bureaucracies and/or under-
standing the law. One potential solution is to redeﬁne the role of the agency representative.
Because they are repeat players with access to the law and bureaucratic ﬁles, they are by
deﬁnition more powerful and knowledgeable than clients. It may be more effective to shift
their role or have an additional agency representative act as a ‘‘friend of the court,’’ rather
than as an adversary, as other public beneﬁt appeals systems have successfully done
(Baldwin, Wikeley, and Young 1992). Agency representatives would be responsible for
objectively seeking out information, including evidence favorable to the client, to assist
the hearing ofﬁcer in assessing the facts and law. Instead of an advocate with the goal
of wining, their primary objective would be to ensure the agency acted properly. Requiring
agency representatives to seek out favorable evidence would also lessen the inherent dis-
advantages clients bring to the hearing room. Such a redeﬁnition of the agency represen-
tatives’ role and responsibilities would likely enhance the procedural fairness of the
hearings, invite fuller participation by clients, and improve the quality of decisions. In
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short, it would enhance one of the few tools at clients’ disposal for correcting agency error,
thus increasing accountability in public welfare agencies.
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